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Where does altruism come from?
Can altruism be reconciled with evolutionary theory? Philosopher
of biology, Jonathan Birch
(http://www.lse.ac.uk/philosophy/people/faculty/#jonathan-birch),
discusses “Hamilton’s Rule”.
The natural world is full of examples of apparently “altruistic” behaviour: behaviour that
detracts from an organism’s chances of survival and reproduction in order to boost the
chances of another. Think of worker ants rearing the larvae of the queen, or a meerkat
making an alarm call to warn others of a nearby snake. Behaviour like this used to
present evolutionary biologists with a puzzle. Isn’t evolution a matter of “survival of the
ퟋ�ttest”? If so, how come there is so much behaviour that clearly makes an organism less
ퟋ�t?
In the early 1960s, an LSE/UCL graduate student called Bill Hamilton
(https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/W._D._Hamilton) came up with a solution.* His basic
insight was this: when interacting organisms share genes, they sometimes have an
evolutionary incentive to help each other. And, crucially, the size of their incentive to
help is proportional to the degree of genetic relatedness between them. It’s an insight
captured pithily by the geneticist J.B.S. Haldane, who remarked that he would lay down
his own life “for two brothers or eight cousins.”
But while Haldane came up with a nice quip, it was Hamilton who came up with a
mathematically rigorous theory. He showed that you can derive a remarkably simple
result, now known as “Hamilton’s rule”, that speciퟋ�es the conditions in which a social
trait will be favoured by natural selection. It says that a social trait will be selected when r
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multiplied by b is greater than c, where “c” is the ퟋ�tness cost to the organism that has
the trait, “b” is the ퟋ�tness beneퟋ�t the trait confers on another organism, and “r” is the
genetic relatedness between the two organisms.
The main qualitative prediction of Hamilton’s work is that, when we ퟋ�nd an organism
performing a costly helping behaviour, we should expect to see the beneퟋ�t falling on its
genetic relatives rather than on genetically unrelated organisms. This is indeed what we
see. In social insects like ants and termites, in bacteria, in amoebae, in social mammals
like wolves, chimps, gorillas, baboons, meerkats… and even, to some extent, in humans.
In recent years, however, Hamilton’s theory—usually known as the theory of “kin
selection”—has come under ퟋ�re. For example, E. O. Wilson, the famous author of
Sociobiology, was once an enthusiastic supporter but has since changed his mind. In
August 2010, a strongly worded critique of kin selection by Martin Nowak, Corina Tarnita
and E. O. Wilson ignited a new round of debate, which has since continued unabated. So
does Hamilton’s theory lie in tatters, or is it healthier than ever? It depends on whom you
ask.
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In a couple of recent (http://bjps.oxfordjournals.org/content/65/2/381.full) papers
(http://bioscience.oxfordjournals.org/content/65/1/22.full) (both available through Open
Access), I try to make some sense of this on-going controversy. As a philosopher of
science, rather than a practising biologist, I’ve been able to approach the issue with a
certain detachment: rather than simply seeking to vindicate or debunk kin selection, my
aim has been to tease out the subtle conceptual and philosophical disagreements that
lie at the heart of the debate.
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The key to moving things forward, in my view, is to get clear about what exactly we mean
by “Hamilton’s rule”. There are various di韌�erent versions that deퟋ�ne cost, beneퟋ�t and
relatedness in subtly di韌�erent ways. On some versions the rule almost never holds,
whereas on other versions it almost always holds. Nowak, Tarnita and Wilson claimed it
“almost never holds” because they had one of the more fragile versions in mind.
In “Hamilton’s Rule and Its Discontents”
(http://bjps.oxfordjournals.org/content/65/2/381.full), I discuss the di韌�erent versions in
more detail. While this may initially seem like a rather narrow, technical issue, it turns
out to connect in interesting ways to broader philosophical debates about causation and
explanation. The more general versions of Hamilton’s rule buy their generality at the
expense of causal detail. This leads to the accusation that they explain nothing—that all
the explanatory power has gone. But it depends on what you mean by “explanation”.
As I see it, the most general version of Hamilton’s rule, though not very useful for
generating quantitative, testable predictions, serves as a kind of “organizing principle”
for social evolution research. It allows us to see what otherwise disparate models of the
evolution of cooperation have in common: they are all models in which r multiplied by b
is greater than c. And it allows us to distinguish three broad categories of causal process
in social evolution: those that alter relatedness, those that alter beneퟋ�t, and those that
alter cost. So despite its limitations, the principle still has a pivotal role in the theory.
There are other issues in the mix here too. Part of the debate is about the right measure
of “ퟋ�tness”: should we count e韌�ects on relatives, as Hamilton’s notion of “inclusive
ퟋ�tness” does, or should we only count an organism’s direct o韌�spring? And in the
background there is the spectre of ‘group selection’—an idea also known as “multi-level
selection”—which E. O. Wilson and his allies hold up as a viable alternative to kin
selection.
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In “Kin Selection and Its Critics”
(http://bioscience.oxfordjournals.org/content/65/1/22.full), Samir Okasha and I bring
these strands together to provide an overview of the controversy. One of the key claims
we make is that the methodologies of kin selection and group selection are formally
equivalent—in the sense that gene frequency change can be accurately calculated either
way—but not necessarily causally equivalent. From a causal point of view, the two
approaches give us quite di韌�erent pictures of what is going on when altruism evolves.
We think it’s worth trying to spell out their di韌�ering causal commitments, in the hope of
actually testing which process is occurring in any given case.
This is one exciting direction for further work. It could even help reconcile the two camps
in the current controversy over kin selection, though that may be a bit too much to hope
for.
 
By Jonathan Birch (http://www.lse.ac.uk/philosophy/people/faculty/#jonathan-birch)
Jonathan Birch is Assistant Professor in the Department of Philosophy, Logic and Scientiퟋ�c
Method. A selection of his work is available here (http://philpapers.org/proퟋ�le/8764).
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*Hamilton’s graduate work was funded through the Department of Sociology at LSE, and
his iconic ퟋ�rst paper, “The Evolution of Altruistic Behavior” (1963), carries that address.
But he was also associated with the Galton Laboratory at UCL, and he gave this as the
address for his even more iconic second paper, “The Genetical Evolution of Social
Behaviour” (1964).
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Steve Davis  23rd September 2016 at 2:24 am - Reply
(http://www.lse.ac.uk/philosophy/blog/2015/06/19/where-does-altruism-
come-from/?replytocom=902#respond)
Jonathan, you referred in the ퟋ�rst paragraph to the altruism of worker ants
rearing larvae, but this is an example of the problems that have arisen for
the Hamiltonian school by their habit of redeퟋ�ning terms to suit an agenda.
Their deퟋ�nition of altruism cannot apply to the eusocial insects. 
When a worker bee or ant feeds the queen, or feeds pupae, she cannot
lower her direct ퟋ�tness as she has no direct ퟋ�tness. She is sterile. She does
have indirect ퟋ�tness however, as she can contribute to the production of
adult o韌�spring. The act of feeding the queen or pupae contributes to the
production of adult o韌�spring of the queen. Because feeding the queen or
pupae is an indirect ퟋ�tness act, a contribution to the ퟋ�tness of kin, it is a
demonstration of ퟋ�tness. As such it cannot be seen as lowering ퟋ�tness,
therefore such acts are not altruistic. It follows from this that parental
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altruism in general, often referred to, also cannot exist. 
You said, “His basic insight was this: when interacting organisms share
genes, they sometimes have an evolutionary incentive to help each other.
And, crucially, the size of their incentive to help is proportional to the
degree of genetic relatedness between them.” That was taken beautifully to
its logical nonsensical conclusion in The Selퟋ�sh Gene where Dawkins
declared without a hint of a blush that a cake should be cut in portions
proportional to the relatedness of the recipients. (The Selퟋ�sh Gene 30th
Anniv. Edition (Oxford University Press 2006) 94, 291) 
You said, “when we ퟋ�nd an organism performing a costly helping behaviour,
we should expect to see the beneퟋ�t falling on its genetic relatives rather
than on genetically unrelated organisms. This is indeed what we see. In
social insects like ants and termites, in bacteria, in amoebae, in social
mammals like wolves, chimps, gorillas, baboons, meerkats… and even, to
some extent, in humans.” That which you see is an illusion, an assumption,
a logical fallacy. The fallacy on which Hamilton’s Rule is based is the classical
“correlation is causation.” It cannot be assumed that cooperation is kinship
based. In the case of humans we are more altruistic towards elderly
neighbours unable to reciprocate than we are to kin. In the case of social
animals, insects and bacteria, the altruism is also not based on kinship. It is
also based on proximity. Cooperation assists survival so we cooperate with
those most likely to be able to assist us, which in the natural world is those
closest to us. Cooperation with elderly neighbours or those unable to
reciprocate becomes altruism. 
I’m not a mathematician, but I’d say it’s highly likely that for every
application of Hamilton’s Rule that is alleged to support the kinship
hypothesis, if the kinship factor was replaced with a proximity factor the
result would be identical. And the fact is, that we often see examples of
non-kin cooperation not only in human society, but throughout the natural
world.
Steve Davis  24th September 2016 at 1:14 am - Reply
(http://www.lse.ac.uk/philosophy/blog/2015/06/19/where-does-altruism-
come-from/?replytocom=903#respond)
Those interested in the origins of altruism should also be aware of the
shady origin of the inclusive ퟋ�tness concept. 
Hamilton was an unabashed eugenicist, and despite his denial that his
passion for eugenics (that’s not hyperbole) did not in韓�uence his
development of inclusive ퟋ�tness, it’s clear from his Narrow Roads of Gene
Land that eugenics was a powerful in韓�uence. 
Hamilton’s passion for eugenics was fuelled by his fear of overpopulation,
and inclusive ퟋ�tness is concerned with the production of adult o韌�spring, so
to deny a link is futile. (For a more detailed explanation see
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It should also be of interest that the lack of logic at the heart of eugenics
has been replicated in the inclusive ퟋ�tness concept and carried through to
gene-centrism in general. Just as the eugenicist assumes that poverty
criminality and poor health are gene-based, (the “correlation is causation”
fallacy) so the kin selectionist assumes that cooperation is gene-based by
the same faulty reasoning. And all this despite this clear statement from
Hamilton; “Inclusive ퟋ�tness may be imagined as the personal ퟋ�tness that an
individual actually expresses in its production of adult o韌�spring as it
becomes after it has ퟋ�rst been stripped and then augmented in a certain
way. It is stripped of all components which can be considered as due to the
individual’s social environment, leaving the ퟋ�tness which he would express
if not exposed to any of the harms or beneퟋ�ts of that environment. This
quantity is then augmented by certain fractions of the quantities of harm or
beneퟋ�t which the individual causes to the ퟋ�tness of his neighbours. The
fractions in question are simply the co-e្�cients of relationship appropriate
to the neighbours he a韌�ects; unity for clonal individuals, one half for sibs,
one quarter for half-sibs, one eighth for cousins…and ퟋ�nally zero for all
neighbours whose relationship can be considered negligibly small”
(Hamilton Narrow Roads of Gene Land Vol. 1, 38) By any fair reading of that
statement inclusive ퟋ�tness is an artiퟋ�cial construct not representative of
actually existing phenomena. But for what purpose? To support Fisher’s
General Theory which was itself intended to support eugenics. 
And Hamilton was not going to let facts get in the way. “My ideas about kin
selection were at last written down and submitted to a journal. I was pretty
sure they were right – that is, that they were correctly argued. If right in this
way, it was clear that no amount of evidence from nature would make them
wrong;…” (Hamilton Narrow Roads of Gene Land Vol. 3, 80) 
And this, “But even before this, still at Cambridge, I had made the decision
that I would not even try to come abreast of the important work that was
being done around me on the molecular side of genetics. This might well be
marvellous in itself; I admitted the DNA story to concern life’s most
fundamental executive code. But, to me, this wasn’t the same as reading
life’s real plan. I was convinced that none of the DNA stu韌� was going to help
me understand the puzzles raised by my reading of Fisher and Haldane or
to ퟋ�ll in the gaps they left…” (Hamilton Narrow Roads of Gene Land Vol. 1,
12) This is a clear admission of a prior agenda. How did this ever gain
traction?
Steve Davis  24th September 2016 at 1:18 am - Reply
(http://www.lse.ac.uk/philosophy/blog/2015/06/19/where-does-altruism-
come-from/?replytocom=904#respond)
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Sorry, that should be Fisher’s Genetical Theory.
Steve Davis  26th September 2016 at 12:46 pm - Reply
(http://www.lse.ac.uk/philosophy/blog/2015/06/19/where-does-altruism-
come-from/?replytocom=906#respond)
Actually Jonathan, the precise nature of the deퟋ�nitions of biological ퟋ�tness
and biological altruism creates a serious problem for kin selection. The
concept claims to explain the origin of altruism, as the title of your article
indicates, but when altruism is an act that lowers ퟋ�tness and ퟋ�tness is the
capacity to produce adult o韌�spring, we see that altruism within kinship
groups is becoming di្�cult to explain. It simply cannot be argued that
raising o韌�spring is altruistic. Can a mother feeding a child be seen as
altruistic? Feeding a child is a demonstration of ퟋ�tness and therefore cannot
lower ퟋ�tness. Raising a child cannot be seen as reducing the capacity to
raise a child. Parental altruism is therefore impossible. 
The same problem exists for kin altruism. Assisting the survival of cousins is
an inclusive ퟋ�tness act, a demonstration of inclusive ퟋ�tness, and therefore
cannot lower inclusive ퟋ�tness. Assisting the survival of cousins cannot be
seen as reducing the capacity to assist their survival, so kin altruism is a
ퟋ�ction. Kin altruism also fails as it is a function carried out at the group level
and there is no nett loss of group ퟋ�tness. 
Does assisting cousins lower the individual ퟋ�tness of the actor? Yes, but only
in a sense so narrow as to be meaningless. Consider Hamilton’s position
that the concept of inclusive ퟋ�tness is “stripped of all components which
can be considered as due to the individual’s social environment”. If we
accept the stripping of all social components then it must be acknowledged
that we are now dealing with a concept that is separated from reality. In
reality, assistance to kin is reciprocated; the loss of individual ퟋ�tness is
regained, so there is no nett loss of ퟋ�tness for the individual therefore there
is no altruism. 
There is therefore no such thing as kin altruism or reciprocal altruism, as
there is no loss of ퟋ�tness involved in both cases. Kin selection is no more
than a construct comprised of a jumble of contradictory meaningless
concepts, and it certainly does not explain the origin of altruism.
Let’s go back to your discussion of proportional altruism. You said, “His
basic insight was this: when interacting organisms share genes, they
sometimes have an evolutionary incentive to help each other.” That is
merely an assumption based on correlation implying causation. Interacting
organisms can share more than genes. They share proximity. And when we
see cooperation between unrelated organisms (as we do on a regular basis)
we see that shared genes cannot be the determining factor. Shared genes
are therefore irrelevant to cooperation. The only common factors are
proximity and in some cases need. If need does not apply to one party then
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this may be altruism, or it may be reciprocal cooperation. It cannot be
reciprocal altruism as this, we have seen, cannot exist. So if need is not
applicable to one party and we have a case of genuine altruism, this leaves
the origin of altruism unresolved, with the Hamiltonian input to the
question basically irrelevant.
Jonathan Birch (http://personal.lse.ac.uk/birchj1/)  18th October 2016 at
6:23 pm - Reply (http://www.lse.ac.uk/philosophy/blog/2015/06/19/where-
does-altruism-come-from/?replytocom=927#respond)
Thanks for these interesting comments. I regret that I don’t have time to
reply at length. One quick comment though: workers in most social insect
species are not fully sterile. They have ovaries and can lay unfertilised eggs,
which develop into males. However, the vast majority of workers raise the
queen’s larvae instead of attempting to produce their own. This is a good
case of biological altruism in Hamilton’s sense, since rearing the queen’s
larvae detracts from the direct ퟋ�tness of the actor. In a minority of species,
such as leafcutter ants of the genus Atta, the workers are completely sterile.
I agree there is potentially something a bit misleading about describing the
actions of a completely sterile worker as altruistic, because its direct ퟋ�tness
is always zero, regardless of its behaviour. Cooperation is probably a better
term than altruism in these cases.
Steve Davis  19th October 2016 at 8:18 pm - Reply
(http://www.lse.ac.uk/philosophy/blog/2015/06/19/where-does-
altruism-come-from/?replytocom=930#respond)
Jonathan, thanks for the reply. 
You said that a worker bee can produce o韌�spring but chooses instead
to raise o韌�spring of the queen. This raises the question as to why this
is so. I’m no expert but my guess is that because hive activities are
strongly in韓�uenced by pheromones, (as in re-queening a hive,) that
this is not a choice made by the worker, instead the worker is
in韓�uenced by pheromones to perform in a certain way. While
in韓�uenced in this way she has been chemically sterilised. Being
sterile, she has no ퟋ�tness, so cannot lower ퟋ�tness, so cannot be
altruistic. Even if the in韓�uence is some form of communication other
than pheromones, the worker is e韌�ectively sterile. It matters not if
that in韓�uence can be turned on and o韌� by the hive, while operating
under that in韓�uence the worker has no personal ퟋ�tness and so
cannot be altruistic. 
But let’s look at the big picture. The whole intent of the inclusive
ퟋ�tness idea is to show that there is no loss of ퟋ�tness at all – that an
individual can manage its ퟋ�tness activities at an alternative level. That
6/12/2017 Where does altruism come from? | Philosophy, Logic and Scientific Method
http://www.lse.ac.uk/philosophy/blog/2015/06/19/where­does­altruism­come­from/ 10/10
Leave A Comment
Name (required) Email (required) Website
level of choice is now the kinship group. The ퟋ�tness drive has now
become a group activity. Yet Hamilton deliberately tried to exclude
the group from the concept, restricting it to “the personal ퟋ�tness that
an individual expresses”. Arbitrary decisions like that have no place in
science. The inclusive ퟋ�tness concept has been so tightly deퟋ�ned that
it does not re韓�ect reality. Social contributions to ퟋ�tness cannot simply
be “stripped” as Hamilton did. A concept so distant from reality
cannot give us the origin of altruism.
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